Opinion: Competition for technology services will help transform public media

The settlement of the lawsuit brought by NPR against CPB is good news. NPR heralded the settlement as a victory for the First Amendment. That may be true, but NPR also had another motive that came out in the court filings and hearings. They wanted to prevent Public Media Infrastructure (a new nonprofit) or any other entity from being eligible for interconnection or technology funding from CPB.

The judge was receptive to NPR’s First Amendment arguments but rejected NPR’s claim of exclusivity. He allowed the CPB grant to PMI, awarded through a competitive process, to move forward. He also limited any claims by NPR to the $36 million they originally proposed for the Public Radio Satellite System. This set the stage for a settlement.

Had the judge ruled in NPR’s favor, public media would be moving backward rather than forward. NPR would have a monopoly on program distribution and a larger range of foundational technology that public media needs going forward.

That would not be a good outcome for the public media ecosystem. Why? Nearly 20 years ago, NPR aspired to create an ecosystem-focused digital tech initiative. It didn’t go well. A short history lesson is instructive.

In early 2008, NPR acquired an organization called Public Interactive, which had been created in 1999 to help public radio stations expand their web-based services. The idea came out of a planning process called “New Realities” in which NPR correctly identified the shift toward digital consumption to be a huge opportunity and challenge.

At that time, public radio’s internet strategy was still nascent. NPR and stations could reach consumers directly via websites, podcasting, apps and social media. There were gains in audience reach but only modest revenues for NPR or stations. NPR’s leadership eagerly led pilots and experiments like “Project Argo,” which attracted CPB and foundation funding to create a network of local station blogs.

Members of the NPR board at that time (I was one of them) thought Public Interactive a good fit with NPR’s strategic portfolio. We saw it as being focused on the greater good of the ecosystem, doing what was best for local stations rather than what might be best for NPR.

When acquired, Public Interactive was kept separate from NPR’s own tech teams. It remained in Boston rather than moving to NPR headquarters. To fund it, NPR established a mandatory extra fee on member organizations which ranged from $1,800 to $100,000 per year. It was renamed NPR Digital Services.

In 2017, NPR decided to shutter the Boston operation and subsume Digital Services into its own tech operation to save money. A single team was charged with supporting NPR’s own technical needs while simultaneously supporting the broader needs to the public radio ecosystem. Having one team, one leader and two distinct missions created resource constraints and conflicts, particularly as NPR’s own digital ambitions and revenues grew.

The mandatory fee remained in place despite broad-based concerns among member stations about the value they received. In 2019 as part of a new fee structure, NPR finally eliminated the fees. Digital Services was no more, although NPR continued attempts at providing tech infrastructure through CPB-funded efforts like the Grove content management system.

NPR Digital Services began as a sound strategy and with good intent. But good intentions weren’t enough. Three key factors led to its demise.

• Governance: NPR Digital Services had independent management for some of its existence. But it never had independent governance. It reported to an NPR executive as a department like any other. It was subject to the changing priorities of a revolving door of executives and NPR’s cyclical financial challenges.
• Competing Interests: When Digital Services was created, NPR focused mostly on providing content and related services to stations. As podcast advertising became a significant revenue source for NPR, monetizing content distributed direct to audiences became a driving force. The interests of NPR and the greater ecosystem were no longer one and the same.
• Mandatory Fees: NPR’s mandatory fees created a captive relationship. Fees were paid regardless of value or quality. There was no incentive to innovate and provide great service. Resentment and dissatisfaction grew instead of a thriving service.

These three factors — lack of independent governance, competing interests and mandatory fees — ultimately doomed Digital Services. The CPB-NPR settlement creates the opportunity for a reset.

We’ve learned a great deal from how the media ecosystem has evolved in the last 20 years. And that learning is baked into the design of PMI.

PMI is independent. It was created by a consortium of five public radio organizations (PRX, Station Resource Group, New York Public Radio, American Public Media and the National Federation of Community Broadcasters). Its governance structure brings together voices from across the entire ecosystem, from the smallest rural stations to the largest networks, including many that are not NPR members.

PMI’s approach is rooted in choice and value. Public media organizations will be able to use services as they see fit, with no mandated fees. For the term of the CPB agreement (until September 2030), essential services will be offered at no cost or minimal cost. The responsibility is on PMI to create a portfolio of technology, tools and services that are useful, worth adopting and sustainable for the long term.

PMI has a singular focus on transforming public media’s technology for the multichannel, on-demand, digitally native audiences that represent our future. There is no other driving force competing for attention and resources or creating conflicts of interest. The interests of PMI will be the interests of the ecosystem.

The result of the settlement is that two entities (PMI and the Public Radio Satellite System managed by NPR) are funded to provide services that may seem similar. This may be confusing but from everything I’ve read and heard, there is not much overlap.

PRSS will continue to operate the satellite interconnection with funding coming directly from CPB. PMI has no role in the current satellite system.

The overlap is in terrestrial broadcast interconnection. But that’s not new. For years, two competing systems of terrestrial broadcast interconnection have co-existed — Content Depot (PRSS) and PRX Exchange (which will become a service of PMI). So, nothing really changes on that front.

PMI’s focus is much broader than terrestrial broadcast interconnection. The vision is to modernize public media’s technology infrastructure so that we can better serve audiences wherever they are and however they want. Satellite and terrestrial broadcast interconnection are still needed and will be for years to come. But stations and producers increasingly need innovative, efficient and less expensive tools and infrastructure for digital publishing, data and analytics, next-generation monetization for podcasts and other products and more.

In its waning days, CPB is making a significant investment in public media’s future by funding PMI. CPB ensured that current interconnection services will operate for years to come while also investing in future-focused infrastructure and services to further public media’s mission in an era of significant change. We should all be thankful for their leadership.

Going forward, there’s plenty of room for NPR, PMI and others to create value for public media, whether they find common ground or not. Competition is good and leads to better outcomes than monopolies. Everyone, including NPR, should be thankful that this important concept was upheld.

Steve Bass served as president and CEO of Oregon Public Broadcasting from 2006 to 2024. He is board vice chair of PRX, one of the partners in PMI.